Maldonado and Bailey Depart Kansas City

Today’s Penning Bull covers the Cubs’ side of the trade that sent Martín Maldonado to Chicago in exchange for fellow double-M Mike Montgomery. It also touches on the Royals swapping Homer Bailey to the A’s. Here’s an excerpt, on how the Cubs will juggle Maldonado, Willson Contreras, and Victor Caratini:

Something about the timing and nature of this move has people thinking it means something bigger. There had already been whispers that the team would treat Caratini as a trade chip; those whispers have given way to full-throated discussion. A frequent line of thinking on Twitter right now is that when Contreras is ready to return (technically, just before the deadline), the room on the roster will come from a deal that jettisons Caratini in exchange for the relief upgrade the Cubs sorely need.

I don’t view it that way. In every season of the Joe Madden era, the Cubs have carried three catchers at certain points. In 2015, they opened with Wellington Castillo as an ill-fitting spare part alongside Miguel Montero and David Ross. Later that season, with Castillo long traded, the team brought Kyle Schwarber up to join the rotation of catchers, moonlighting there while also getting at-bats as a left fielder. In 2016, they opened with the notion of Schwarber serving as a third catcher again. He went down for the year in the second series, but by mid-June, Contreras had come up, and he would take time from both Montero and Ross (along with some outfield work of his own) throughout the second half and the postseason. In 2017, they started with just Montero and Contreras, and after Montero was cut in a fit of pique in June, Madden quickly began riding Contreras too hard. The front office dealt for Alex Avila in July, to ameliorate that state of affairs, and then in August, they traded for Rene Rivera to provide depth in September. Last year, they carried Chris Gimenez for about half the season, kept Taylor Davis on call in Iowa, and swapped Gimenez for Bobby Wilson as an emergency option down the stretch. 

I think the Cubs will listen if a team makes an exceptionally attractive offer for Caratini, but I don’t think they plan to move him. I think they want Maldonado to stabilize the run-prevention infrastructure a bit, and be a veteran voice for the catching cadre.

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Red Sox Acquire Andrew Cashner

Today’s edition of Penning Bull consists of my breakdown of the Red Sox’s trade for erstwhile Orioles righthander Andrew Cashner. Here’s a brief excerpt:

Cashner still throws that heater at roughly 94 miles per hour, so he has some ability to overpower opponents. His changeup works off that pitch much better than it worked off the sinker, because it creates much more movement differential (as you would guess, Cashner’s sinker both drops more and moves more to the arm side than does his four-seamer) and a greater velocity differential. He can also change eye levels better with the pitch, because he’s both more confident and more effective in the upper half of the zone with the four-seamer than with the sinker.

The same things largely true of the changeup are even more true of Cashner’s revamped curveball, which he’s throwing with less speed but greater vertical movement. That means that he’d be getting more of a movement differential even if he were still throwing the sinker, but with the switch to more four-seamers, it’s been especially pronounced. He’s getting a lot of ground balls with that pitch this season, which helps explain his success despite a low strikeout rate.

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The Twins’ Slugging, Shifting Infield

Today’s Penning Bull is about the marquee matchup of the first weekend after the All-Star break, featuring the Twins and the Indians. Specifically, I hone in on the Twins’ infield, a fascinating unit that has been the difference-maker for them so far this year. Here’s a brief excerpt.

These days, there’s always a new analytical frontier in MLB, and one of this season’s is a dramatic league-wide increase in defensive shifts against right-handed batters. 

Prior to 2019, the only team documented to have shifted righties at least 25 percent of the time was the 2017 Rays, at 25.8 percent. This season, five teams—perhaps the exact five you would guess, and perhaps the five most analytically advanced organizations in the game—are at or above that 25-percent threshold. The Astros shift right-handers exactly that often. The Dodgers, Orioles, and Rays all shift somewhere between 32 and 37 percent of righties. The Twins have shifted those batters 42.3 percent of the time.

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Catchers and Concussions

Today’s Penning Bull focuses on catchers and concussions. Here’s an excerpt, on the unfortunate play that left Jonathan Lucroy concussed just prior to the All-Star break:

Marisnick has taken some exceptionally harsh criticism for the play, and that’s understandable. As he admitted, he made a mistake and it caused a severe injury to another player. Where some see intentional malice or negligence, fhough, I saw a player redirect himself two separate times, seemingly seeking the best path to an open corner of home plate. Some (including Yadier Molina, bless him) saw those moves as aiming for Lucroy, but remember: the play was coming from the line in right. I firmly accept, and believed even before Marisnick explained it this way, that he was unable to read Lucroy’s body language as he set up to take the throw, and that he thought he could sneak in the front door if Lucroy let the ball travel and tried to tag him toward the back edge of the plate. For a runner, that throw is the hardest to read. If it’s coming from left field, every movement the catcher makes will tell you something useful about where the ball is. If it’s coming from center, you know any throw that’s on line will basically put the catcher at the front third-base corner of home. Catchers waiting for throws from right, however, have to set up sideways, like a shortstop waiting for a throw on a stolen-base attempt. That makes their movements, large and small, hard to read. I don’t think Marisnick meant to hurt anyone, or even collide to drive the ball out of Lucroy’s mitt; I think he’s a really fast guy who missed a read and couldn’t adjust quickly enough. I still think, though, that he probably ought to have been ejected, in addition to being called out (as he was) for the collision. That’s a smallish but meaningful message, and penalty, akin to having players tossed from NBA games for flagrant fouls, and I think it’s probably time to make that the rule.

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José Alvarado’s Over-the-Top Sinker

Today’s Penning Bull is about José Alvarado, the new pride and joy of pitching Twitter, and about his dastardly sinker—what it is, and what it isn’t, and what does and doesn’t make it uniquely dominant. Here’s a teaser.

Alas, batters are rarely fooled by sinker movement, which is why they have a considerably higher league-wide contact rate against the pitch than against any other.

Contact Rate on Swings, By Pitch, MLB, 2019 (%)

Sinker – 84.6

Fastball – 78.1

Cutter – 75.2

Curveball – 68.2

Changeup – 68.1

Slider – 63.0

Splitter – 62.5

It’s also why the league is throwing fewer sinkers every year—why, indeed, it’s becoming a specialty pitch for a handful of relievers and a rare secondary option for most others who throw it. The sinker just isn’t as nasty as it seems, motion trails be damned. Besides, Alvarado’s movement doesn’t set him apart from the pack. Here are the 10 hurlers whose sinkers move to the arm side least, so far this season, of 89 qualifying pitchers:

Average Sinker Movement, Glove Side, MLB, 2019, Min. 50 Thrown (in.)

Mike Leake: -6.0

Brad Keller: -6.4

Dereck Rodriguez: -6.6

Marcus Stroman: -6.6

Joe Biagini: -6.6

Sonny Gray: -6.7

Jameson Taillon: -6.8

Kyle Hendricks: -7.0

Lance Lynn: -7.1

José Alvarado: -7.3

It’s important to note that being at either extreme, where movement is concerned, is usually preferable to being average. The fact that Alvarado’s sinker moves less to the arm side than those of most hurlers doesn’t necessarily speak badly of it; we might do better to think about these guys’ movement as having an unusual amount of cut, for a sinker, rather than as lacking tailing action.

Where vertical movement is concerned, Alvarado also isn’t an outlier, though again, he’s close to one end of the spectrum.

Average Sinker Movement, Vertical Rise, MLB, 2019, Min. 50 Thrown (in.)

Jake Odorizzi: 9.8

Nate Jones: 8.9

Joe Biagini: 8.6

José Quintana: 8.0

Tanner Roark: 7.9

Dereck Rodríguez: 7.9

Marco Gonzales: 7.9

Fernando Rodney: 7.7

Mike Fiers: 7.5

José Alvarado: 7.4

Again, when we think of exceptional sinker movement, we tend to think of the greatest possible downward movement. That’s not how it works in all cases, though, and Alvarado’s rise might work in his favor. As with the lateral movement, the vital takeaway is that he’s not shredding opponents by making the ball take off in any particular direction, in a way other pitchers don’t.

That leaves us with the question of what is unique about Alvarado, though, and there turns out to be plenty.

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Jose Peraza IS the Reds

The latest edition of Penning Bull is about Jose Peraza’s quasi-breakout season in Cincinnati: the good, the not-as-good-as-it-looks, and the quietly-very-bad. Here’s an excerpt:

It’s very encouraging that he’s been able to make these changes without losing the ability to make contact at an above-average rate. In fact, Peraza remains one of the least strikeout-prone full-time hitters in the league, and pitchers struggle to miss his bat within the strike zone. On the other hand, he’s remained aggressive, and pitchers have remained largely unafraid of him. In what’s otherwise looked like a breakout campaign, he’s only gotten on base at a .332 clip. If he’d developed the ability to hit the ball harder, rather than to lift it more, his athleticism (and particularly his speed) might be put to a higher use, but as it is, he’s reached base at just a .314 clip on balls in play.

More importantly, despite nominally sticking at shortstop all season, he’s demonstrated pretty clearly that he’s a below-average defender at that position, and any movement in that talent level for a player finishing up his age-24 season is likely to be in the wrong direction. If this newfound power is the sort of thing he’ll have to fight to maintain, as pitchers adjust their approaches and opportunities to ambush pitches become scarce, then Peraza’s overall value dries up in a hurry. He’ll finish the season with a stout two or three wins in each formulation of WAR(P), but that overstates both the actual value he’s delivered and the value he’s likely to provide in years to come.

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The Unshiftables

Today’s post is about the two pitchers whose teams have yet to employ a defensive shift behind them this season, and what that tells us. Given Saturday night’s news about Mike Matheny, it’s of particular interest.

Two hundred sixty-five pitchers have faced at least 150 batters this season, and only two have yet to pitch in front of a defensive shift. Those two pitchers are Shohei Ohtani and Jordan Hicks.

Obviously, Hicks and Ohtani have more than one thing in common. They both have elite velocity, and it can be a bit harder to predict where opponents will hit the ball when a flamethrower is on the hill. It seems to me, however, that the primary reason these two particular guys wouldn’t be shifted behind is that their teams don’t have the information they would need to do it confidently. Ohtani, of course, hadn’t pitched in the United States prior to this spring. Hicks jumped right past Double- and Triple-A. Mikes Matheny and Scioscia (no gurus of communication with young or inexperienced players, and slow implementers of even the most fundamental, common-sense innovation) have just not seen any benefit in moving defenders around behind their young fireballers.

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